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NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
WaiAm W. TALLEY II*
I.
In 1984 world oil production increased for the first time since 1979, in-
dicating that world oil markets are adjusting to the dramatic price increases
that occurred in 1979 and 1980 in the wake of the Iranian revolution. National
security implications of the world oil trade may have appeared to decrease
during the past five years as oil imports met a declining share of total energy
consumption by the United States and its allies. As oil prices have eroded,
however, the structural shift away from oil has slowed. As oil regains or at
least maintains market share, the national security worries associated with
dependence on foreign oil resurface.
Twice in the last dozen years major interruptions in the world oil flow have
occurred. The 1973-74 Arab oil embargo triggered the first "energy crisis,"
and the Iranian revolution brought the "second shock." With two-thirds of
the free world's oil reserves located in the strategically vulnerable and politically
unstable Middle East, additional interruptions are likely to occur.
To assess the impact on national security of the international oil trade, a
review of the historical shifts in United States import volumes and sources
should be made. As late as 1970, the United States imported 3.4 million barrels
of oil per day. Most of this oil came from the Western Hemisphere, and almost
none from the Middle East. Natural gas shortages in the United States during
the early 1970s coupled with economic growth, however, created an increased
demand for oil. By 1974, United States oil imports had almost doubled, ex-
ceeding 6.1 million barrels per day. A large percentage of the increase came
from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Nigeria. This increased demand for oil in the
United States helped create the economic circumstances that allowed control
of world oil markets to shift from the major international oil companies to
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
The Arab oil embargo and the resulting price increases failed to dampen
the United States' thirst for oil. The new, higher prices were eroded by infla-
tion and United States oil imports resumed their climb, reaching a peak of
8.7 million barrels per day in 1977 and remaining at 8.5 million barrels per
day in 1979, when imports reached 43 percent of our oil supply. That year,
the United States imported more than 2.1 million barrels per day from the
Middle East. Then came the second shock in 1979, with prices topping $40
per barrel. This price shock threw the Western industrial nations into a severe
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recession. Consumers moved away from oil in earnest, and world oil produc-
tion began a four-year slide.
By 1983, United States oil imports fell to 5 million barrels per day, with
only 575,000 barrels per day coming from the Middle East. United States
oil imports crept up to 5.3 million barrels per day in 1984, but imports ac-
counted for only 30 percent of our oil supply. United States crude oil imports
in 1984 came from a variety of sources. Mexico, the largest source, supplied
658,000 barrels per day, followed by Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Indonesia. These five countries provided more than one-half
of the United States' 1984 crude oil imports. Imports are expected to reach
5.5 million barrels per day in 1985. Thus, as the economy expands and oil
prices decline, there appears to be an increasing dependence on oil imports
again. Currently, oil is readily available from new sources outside the Middle
East. But as production from these more secure suppliers declines, the United
States will be back knocking on the Saudis' door for more oil in the 1990s.
In fact, Chevron predicts that U.S. imports will reach 6.9 million barrels per
day and account for 50 percent of U.S. oil supplies by the year 2000.
If a country seeks new oil supplies in the 1990s, most roads will lead to
the Middle East, which currently holds nearly two-thirds of the free world's
proven oil reserves. By the 1990s, at least five of OPEC's thirteen members,
Ecuador, Gabon, Algeria, Nigeria, and Indonesia, are expected to need all
the oil they produce for their own consumption. The focus of power in OPEC
will shift back to the Persian Gulf states, principally Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq,
and to a lesser extent, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
II.
The United States' primary adversary, the Soviet Union, is not only self-
sufficient in energy, but is also a major exporter of oil and natural gas. The
Soviet Union holds an estimated 81 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, more
than any nation except Saudi Arabia. By comparison, U.S. crude oil reserves
are reported to be 27 billion barrels. The Soviets also have 1,400 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas reserves, more than any other nation and more than 43
percent of the world's total gas reserves.
Soviet oil exports to non-Communist nations worldwide totaled $17.6 billion
in 1984, compared to $18.6 billion in exports to Communist countries. Soviet
gas exports totaled $3.6 billion to non-Communist countries in Europe, ver-
sus $5.1 billion to Communist countries. Oil and gas exports are of enormous
importance to the Soviet Union's foreign trade balance. In 1984 crude and
products accounted for 41.5 percent of all Soviet exports and brought more
than 60 percent of Soviet hard currency receipts from industrially developed,
capitalist countries. From the standpoint of revenue, the Soviet Union's largest
oil customers in 1984 were East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland,
followed by West Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, and France.
After start-up of the new export natural gas pipeline from western Siberia,
West Germany became the Soviet's largest gas customer, buying $1.4 billion
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in 1984. Czechoslovakia was second with $1.3 billion in gas purchases, and
Italy third, with more than $1 billion in gas purchases.
With its huge gas reserves, the Soviet Union is expected to increase natural
gas use by its industries, leaving more oil available for export. However, if
the Soviet's oil situation deteriorates to the point that it needs to import oil,
there is the risk that it could decide to annex Middle Eastern oil fields rather
than paying for the oil.
III.
For United States allies in Western Europe, the energy security picture is
improving. These nations currently produce 3.8 million barrels of oil per day,
with most production coming from the British and Norwegian sectors of the
North Sea. Clearly the advent of North Sea production has had a major im-
pact because as recently as 1975 Western Europe produced only about 500,000
barrels per day.
In 1974, Western Europe imported 14.8 million barrels per day, including
10.2 million barrels per day from the Middle East, 3.2 million barrels per
day from Africa, and I million barrels per day from Eastern Europe, including
the Soviet Union. This represented 97 percent of Western Europe's total oil
consumption. Thus, at the time of the Arab oil embargo, people began to
realize how vulnerable Western Europe was to an oil supply cutoff, even though
the embargo was primarily directed against the United States.
Through a combination of energy conservation, fuel switching, and increased
North Sea production, Western Europe has been able to cut its imports
significantly. For example, in 1984, Western Europe imports dropped to 8.6
million barrels per day, including only 3.7 million barrels per day from the
Middle East. Thus in 1984 imported oil accounted for 70 percent of Western
Europe's total oil consumption. Even though the picture has improved
dramatically since 1974, Western Europe remains vulnerable to a major inter-
ruption in its oil supplies from the Middle East and Africa and in its oil and
natural gas imports from the Soviet Union. Moreover, most of Western
Europe's oil production is from the North Sea and is thus vulnerable to
sabotage or military attack.
In the event of a major interruption in Western Europe's oil supplies, the
United States would be obligated to "share the shortage" through emergency
procedures established by the International Energy Agency (IEA). These
sharing arrangements are designed to reduce the economic leverage that "any
group of producing countries could apply to consuming nations by an embargo.
OPEC production peaked in 1979 at 30.9 million barrels per day, more
than one-half the world's total oil production. By 1984, however, OPEC pro-
duction had fallen to 17.5 million barrels per day, only 34 percent of the
world's total oil production. OPEC is currently capable of producing about
twice its current 16 million barrels per day. The combination of stable or
declining oil demand in the major oil-consuming nations and increased oil-
and natural gas-producing capabilities in many parts of the world has left
OPEC with sharply reduced market power.
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While OPEC production was declining, non-OPEC producers increased their
production by 7.6 million barrels per day. In addition to the gains in Western
Europe mentioned earlier, other major producing gains were recorded in
Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, and India. The Soviet Union, by far the world's largest
oil producer at 12.2 million barrels per day, recorded a small decline in 1984,
its first in forty years.
IV.
The increased geographical diversity of available oil and natural gas sup-
plies reduces the national security risks associated with oil imports in the future.
Exploration in non-OPEC areas, however, has declined with falling oil prices,
so major changes in the world's proven oil reserves are not expected.
In addition to diversifying sources of oil imports, national security can be
enhanced by replacing oil imports with other sources of energy. For example,
the United States currently has a natural gas deliverability surplus of about
3 trillion cubic feet annually. This surplus gas could be used to displace 1.5
million barrels per day of imported oil, nearly one-third of current oil imports.
A national policy that seeks to minimize oil imports for national security
reasons could take advantage of the breathing space provided by the current
world oil surplus. The basic strategy would encompass maintaining domestic
oil production at current levels, approximately 8.9 million barrels per day.
With sufficient domestic refining capacity, this domestic oil production can
more than meet the U.S. demand for transportation fuels. Production of
domestic natural gas and coal could be increased to meet industrial, commer-
cial, and residential demand for stationary energy consumption. Oil and natural
gas imports from Canada and Mexico could then be used to meet any un-
filled demand. With appropriate environmental and tax policies, a national
goal of eliminating oil imports from the Eastern Hemisphere could be achieved.
Domestic synthetic fuels could then enter the market when economically
justified.
The United States' allies have also made progress in shifting to other energy
sources. The International Energy Agency, which represents industrialized
nations in Western Europe, including the United States, Canada, and Japan,
reports that since 1973 its members have increased their output of coal by
more than 29 percent, nuclear energy by more than 270 percent, and hydroelec-
tric power and other energy sources by more than 21 percent. Oil now pro-
vides about 44 percent of the total energy demand for IEA countries, com-
pared to 51.4 percent in 1973. The agency projects that oil's share of the
total energy market will fall to 39 percent in 1990 and to 34 percent by the
year 2000. Although oil imports are projected to increase to offset declining
domestic production, oil imports as a percentage of total energy requirements
of the consuming nations are expected to remain around the current level
of 22 percent until 1990, then fall to 20 percent by 2000.
V.
According to Tom Cutler, of the United States Department of Energy and
chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Petroleum Planning
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Committee, the United States military demand for oil during 1984 totaled
486,500 barrels per day, down more than 50 percent from the 1969 Viet Nam
peak of 1.1 million barrels per day. On a global basis, the handful of regional
conflicts and domestic insurgencies served to boost Allied military demand
in 1984 to near 5 percent of total world consumption, or an estimated 2.5
to 3.5 million barrels per day.
Airplanes, ships, and tanks, which comprise a modern nation's fighting
force, make conventional military operations an oil-intensive activity. These
mobile forces can account for 90 percent of a nation's military oil consump-
tion. For these air and ground uses, there is no feasible energy substitute for
petroleum. Even the introduction of nuclear power at sea has not relieved
navies from their reliance on oil.
Cutler points out that there are two categories of military oil stocks, both
held as refined products. Peacetime operating stocks support current consump-
tion. War reserves are stored to satisfy wartime surge requirements. These
stocks are ideally held in hardened underground facilities protected from enemy
attack and pre-positioned at strategic locations. The U.S. military, for exam-
ple, holds in excess of 30 million barrels of peacetime operating stocks and
about 60 million barrels as wartime reserves. The largest U.S. wartime stocks
are located in Europe and in the Pacific Ocean. In addition, more than 450
million barrels of crude oil have been stored in the National Strategic Petroleum
Reserve through fiscal 1984. This oil has cost the taxpayers $14.5 billion. The
goal for the strategic reserve is 750 million barrels, to be reached by 1990.
Other major oil users, especially West Germany and Japan, also hold sizeable
strategic stocks. IEA governments other than the United States now control
more than 300 million barrels of oil stocks. Were a crisis to occur today,
IEA governments could supply from stocks they now control, as much as
3.7 million barrels per day for the first two months, declining to 3 million
barrels per day for the next six months. While not enough for every con-
ceivable emergency, this draw-down of strategic stocks could cushion the
economic impact of a major crisis and provide time for necessary adjustments.
However, this oil would have to be refined before it would be useful to
the military, which brings up one additional area of concern-the exporta-
tion of the United States' refining capacity to producing countries. United
States refining capacity in 1985 is estimated to be 15.4 million barrels per
day, a 17 percent decline from the 1981 peak capacity of 18.6 million barrels
per day. Conversely, imports of refined petroleum products rose from 1.6
million barrels per day in 1981 to nearly 2 million barrels per day in 1984.
Domestic refinery runs in 1985 are projected to be 12.2 million barrels per
day, or 79 percent of capacity. Thus, while refining capacity is currently ade-
quate, the declining trend in capacity and the increasing trend in product im-
ports since 1981 is cause for concern from a national security standpoint.
In conclusion, one way to judge the strategic importance of the world
petroleum trade is to measure the commitment that potential adversaries of
the United States have made to weapons systems designed to interrupt oil
shipment in the event of war. The Soviet navy, for example, now has 360
submarines, compared to 138 for the United States. A primary mission of
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the Soviet submarine fleet in wartime would be to halt the shipment of oil
and other strategic minerals to the United States and Europe. With this im-
balance in submarine forces, it is doubtful that the U.S. Navy would be able
to protect oil tankers attempting to bring oil from Africa and the Middle
East to the United States and Europe. Therefore, energy policies of the United
States and Europe should seek to accelerate the movement away from
dependence on foreign oil, rather than being lulled into a false sense of security
by the current worldwide oil surplus.
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